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Abstract
The propagation of hoaxes on social media has contributed to political tension in many countries. 
The 2016 US presidential election provides evidence of how fake news can generate more social 
media engagement than real news. In multicultural Indonesia, the history of anti-communist, 
anti-Christian, and anti-Chinese pogroms increases the level of sensitivity and sentiment, 
especially when dealing with racial issues. This paper explores the role of hoaxes in Indonesia’s 
contemporary politics. It investigates the characteristics of hoax information circulated on social 
media during the 2017 Jakarta election using a memetic practice approach. This study perceives 
hoaxes as having acted like memes in terms of the ways in which they dismantle existing source 
material to tap into ideas or sentiments people connect with. Hoaxes as memes alter original 
items into new forms of artifacts, with new messages that resonate with existing beliefs in society. 
Consequently, hoaxes can create a culture based on a shared belief among the community and, in 
the era of increasing polarization, a hoax has the potential to be a means of political partisanship. 
However, with the tendency to overpower the truth and lead people away from believing facts, 
hoaxes can be a threat to participatory democracy.
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Introduction
Social media offers the wide availability 
and facility to exchange information. It also 
provides space for people to aggregate around 
common interests and narratives. At given 
situations, social media allows content to 
spread rapidly across networks and go viral. 
However, social media also provides a quick 
way to convey one-sided information or opinion 
with no capability to verify its authenticity (Del 
Vicario et al., 2016; Sheikh, 2016). 
Prior to the social media age, information 
circulated to the public passed through a 
filtering mechanism based on newsworthiness, 
values, and accuracy. Expert editors in news 
organizations were responsible for sifting 
through information to try to determine its 
validity and veracity (Colón 2017, para. 1), as a 
part of the effort to maintain the organization’s 
as well as the journalist’s reputation. With the 
rise of social media, that gatekeeping role has 
not vanished; however, it increasingly falls to 
social media users (van Dijck & Poell, 2013; 
Colón, 2017) since individuals can connect with 
friends and family, read news and consume 
content from around the world, and then share 
what is meaningful to them (Al Jazeera, 2016, 
“Facebook: Social media platform or news 
gatekeeper?” para. 3). Every user assumes 
the position of a publisher as social media 
technology has democratized the process of 
making—or making up—news. Information 
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flows unimpeded and unchecked through the 
Internet, filling a multitude of websites, blogs, 
and tweets (Colón, 2017, para. 3-4). 
In Indonesia, coinciding with the Jakarta 
gubernatorial election during late 2016 to April 
2017, the emergence of hoaxes intensified, 
attacking the competing candidates. A survey 
of 1,116 respondents by Indonesian Telematics 
Society (Masyarakat Telematika Indonesia/
MASTEL) ten days before the first round of 
Jakarta elections, found that the distribution 
of hoax content was considerably high. As 
much as 44.3% of the respondents stated they 
received hoax content on a daily basis and 
17.2% of them received them more than once 
per day (MASTEL, 2017, p. 18). The survey also 
showed that 91.8% of hoax content received 
by the users contain the topic of social-politics 
(related to gubernatorial election, governance) 
and 88.6% contained a racial theme or SARA.
This paper explores how hoaxes (false 
information) are playing out in Indonesian 
political campaigns in the age of social media. 
It investigates what hoax means in Indonesian 
politics, especially in the era of increasing 
partisanship and polarization. The paper 
investigates the characteristics and pattern of 
hoax information circulated on social media 
during the Jakarta’s gubernatorial election in 
2017 using three memetic dimensions: content, 
form, and stance. The paper begins with a 
literature review on previous studies about 
hoax in Indonesia, followed by the elaboration 
of hoax as memetic practice. The later section 
is an analysis of hoaxes’ characteristics in 
Indonesia, particularly around the 2017 Jakarta 
election.
This research offers novelty as it discusses 
one of the latest political events in Indonesia. 
As the case study, the 2017 Jakarta election 
could arguably reflect the mainstream of 
political dynamics in Indonesia since Jakarta 
is the capital of the country and acts as the 
center of government and political activities 
in Indonesia. However, this research did 
not intend to use the election to generalize 
the political conditions and the dynamics of 
democracy in Indonesia. In addition, to date, 
Indonesian scholarly works that specifically 
elaborate the relationship between social media 
and hoaxes with contemporary politics are still 
limited in number. This research, therefore, is 
aimed at filling this gap and contributes to the 
study of political and cultural implications 
of media and technology, especially in the 
Indonesian context. Furthermore, this research 
also discusses the importance and impact of 
users’ intervention in their engagement with 
social media text in a unique Indonesian 
context. 
Literature Review
Hoaxes have been around for many 
years. The term “hoax” was introduced for 
the first time by MacDougall in his classical 
book Hoaxes (1958). In the book, he used a 
range of hoaxes circulated in America in early 
20th century as the case study. Hoaxes began 
to explode in Indonesia during the bitterly 
contested 2014 Presidential Election. Blatantly 
false stories were circulated within the social-
media-loving populace by both supporters of 
the eventual winner Joko “Jokowi” Widodo 
and his opponent, Prabowo Subianto. Each 
side was guilty of spreading hoaxes to derail 
the campaign of the other candidates. However, 
most hoax attacks targeted Jokowi—and many 
were based on race and religion. 
In the 2017 Jakarta election, the use of 
hoaxes escalated. The circulation of hoaxes 
intensified during the election period when 
sectarian tensions have been high because 
of the blasphemy trial for Basuki Tjahja 
Purnama or Ahok, the then Jakarta governor 
(Varagur, 2016). In one of his speeches prior to 
the election, Ahok, an incumbent candidate, 
criticized his political rivals for using Islam 
as a campaign tool. He stated that voters 
were deceived by those using verse 51 of 
Sura Al-Maida (hereafter Al-Maida 51) from 
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Muslim’s holy book, Quran (BBC Indonesia, 
2016, “Pidato di Kepulauan Seribu dan hari-
hari hingga Ahok menjadi tersangka” para. 5). 
One interpretation of the verse is that Muslims 
should not choose non-Muslims as a leader 
(Ahok is a Chinese-Christian). 
A video clip capturing his speech went 
viral and ignited outrage among conservative 
Indonesian Muslims. They considered Ahok 
has blasphemed Islam through his speech in 
the video and called for him to be imprisoned 
for violating article 57 of Indonesian Criminal 
Code. The conviction was then followed by 
waves of protests. The invitations to attend 
mass rallies were widely circulated in social 
media. The rallies were also being documented 
via social media platforms such as Facebook, 
Twitter, YouTube, and Instagram. While 
Indonesia has a long story of anti-Chinese 
and anti-Christian persecutions and racial 
sentiment in Indonesian politics is nothing new, 
the Al-Maida 51 viral video reinforced racial 
sentiment in the multicultural country where 
Islam is the majority religion.
According to MASTEL’s survey (2017), 
hoaxes that circulated during the election was 
dominated by political and SARA topics and 
mostly spread through social media. While 
the hoaxes targeted all candidates of the 
Jakarta election, my analysis shows that Ahok 
was the most attacked during the electoral 
campaign. Ahok became the main target of 
public resentment, apart from his problematic 
development policy during his time as Jakarta’s 
Governor. In the lead up to the election, many 
hoaxes were circulated raising racial issues and 
attempting to derail his campaign.
Studies aimed at understanding hoaxes in 
Indonesia are still limited in number, however, 
they offer a variety of perspectives. Wardani 
(2017), for example, analyzed hoax from a 
language perspective. She investigated how 
language was used to manipulate information 
in hoax contents. She concluded that the 
manipulation of language aimed to spread fear 
and panic among the masses. Additionally, 
false information could be used to attack one’s 
feeling of security, hence could be categorized 
as a form of terror (p. 9). Therefore, Wardani 
submitted, the negative impacts of hoaxes 
should alarm the Indonesian community 
and raise concerns about the importance 
of media literacy and critical awareness of 
the use of language in computer-mediated 
communication (p. 9). Pakpahan (2017) 
reviewed Indonesian regulations related to 
the distribution of misinformation. Supporting 
Wardani’s study, Pakpahan explained that 
hoax could aim to influence the audience with 
false information so that they will take action 
according to the contents of the hoax. As a 
false and misleading message of information, 
hoaxes can also terrorize people who receive 
it (p. 479). Similar to Wardani, Pakpahan also 
promoted media literacy education as another 
tool for countering hoaxes in addition to better 
government regulations. 
Nugroho (2017) elaborates the roles 
of the Anti-Defamation Society of Indonesia 
(Masyarakat Anti Fitnah Indonesia or MAFINDO) 
and efforts it has done in countering hoaxes. 
He explains that MAFINDO—established 
under Nugroho and his colleagues’ initiative—
presents as a form of netizens’ resistance 
to dishonesty and injustice in social media, 
especially against the spread of defamation 
and hoaxes. Firmansyah’s research (2017) 
introduced an IT-based effort to fight hoax. He 
developed a fact-checking website as a means 
to control the dissemination of hoax content. 
Studies about the practice of hoax 
distribution were done by Situngkir (2011) as 
well as Anisa & Rachmaniar (2016). Situngkir’s 
social network analysis in 2011 was addressed 
to analyze the propagation of a hoax on Twitter. 
Using a case study of a hoax about a public 
figure’s death, Situngkir concluded that hoaxes 
could garner large population scope in five to 
six steps of tweeting, and potentially become 
more significant unless a conventional media 
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debunked the hoax and stopped it spreading. 
Meanwhile, using virtual ethnography, Anisa 
& Rachmaniar (2016) attempted to recognize 
the target of political hoax information that was 
uploaded on Instagram and users’ responses 
to it. This study revealed that in responding 
to a hoax, Instagram users are divided into 
five types: i) users with negative comments; ii) 
users with positive comments; iii) users with 
neutral comments; iv) users with unrelated 
comments; and v) users with indifferent/
apathetic comments. 
Scholarly works about hoaxes in the 
context of Indonesian politics remain rare. 
Therefore, by investigating the characteristics 
of hoaxes and their patterns of information 
delivery in Indonesian electoral politics 
context, this paper contributes to the study of 
online hoaxes, especially the role of a hoax as 
memetic practice in Indonesia’s contemporary 
democracy.
Hoax: the definition 
First, it is essential to clarify what we mean 
by “hoax.” Researchers have acknowledged the 
difficulty in defining what, exactly, qualifies 
as a hoax. MacDougall (1958) defines hoax 
as “deliberately concocted untruth made to 
masquerade truth” (p. vi). With this definition, 
MacDougall attempts to distinguish hoax from 
honest errors in observation or judgment to 
which everyone is subject. He conveyed that 
a hoax has no basis in fact; however, whether 
its author had a specific intention to make 
people accept a hoax as fact is immaterial to 
his definition (p. vi). 
MacDougall’s study on hoaxes indicates 
that these are nothing new, it is not a term 
or practice engendered by online era. Some 
scholars suggest that fake news can be traced 
back to the ancient Greek era when Octavian’s 
use of false news in his political battle with 
Marc Antony enabled him to succeed Julius 
Caesar (Colón, 2017, para. 7). Now, however, 
social media and digital devices allow oral and 
written falsehoods to be distributed amongst 
the broader community so quickly that the 
impact of a hoax has become more significant 
(Wardani, 2017, p. 3).
If MacDougall emphasized the untruth side 
of a hoax and gave few regards to the intention 
of the creator, this paper supports Kusman’s 
view on a hoax as “false information designed to 
influence or provoke an audience into acting in 
accordance with the interests of the creator and 
circulated through social media” (2017, para. 6). 
Hoaxes in this study are identified as deceptive 
pieces of information intentionally created to 
outwit others by covering up or manipulating 
facts or even making-up false information. The 
creators of hoaxes intentionally fabricate content 
and edit videos or photos to make them look 
authentic and circulate them via social media 
with the aim to deceive public. It is identical to 
Chen et al.’s (2014) argument that hoaxes can 
mislead people’s perception by conveying false 
information as truth. In the political realm, the 
hoax has been exploited to attack a political rival 
since it has the potential to disgrace one’s brand 
and credibility.
Hoax as memetic practice
A further body of work about internet 
memes can also help us to understand 
hoaxes. The term “meme” was coined by 
biologist Richard Dawkins (1976) in his book 
The Selfish Gene to refer to small cultural units 
of transmission, analogous to genes, which are 
spread by copying or imitation. According to 
Dawkins, memes can also be “ideas, symbols or 
practices formed in diverse incarnations, such 
as melodies, catch-phrases, clothing fashion 
or architectural styles” (1976, p. 189-190). 
Although the term “meme” was coined long 
before the digital era, the Internet’s features 
turned memes’ diffusion into a ubiquitous and 
highly visible routine. The scale, scope, and the 
accuracy of memes—or what Dawkins called 
as longevity, fecundity, and copy fidelity (1976, 
p. 194)—are enhanced by the Internet, since 
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digitization allows wide information transfer, 
an increased number of copies made within a 
time unit, and better storage of the information 
(Shifman, 2014, pp. 18-19). 
Shifman defines an internet meme as 
“units of popular culture that are circulated, 
imitated, and transformed by individual 
Internet users, creating a shared cultural 
experience in the process” (2013, p. 367). 
Memes have three dimensions that people can 
potentially imitate: i) content, referencing to 
“both the ideas and the ideologies conveyed 
by it”; ii) form or “the physical incarnation of 
the message, perceived through our senses”; 
and iii) stance that refers to “the ways in which 
addressers position themselves in relation to 
the text, its linguistic codes, the addressees, 
and other potential speakers” (Shifman, 2014, 
pp. 39-40). These categories will be applied in 
the following sections to the analysis of hoax 
content in Indonesia. The memetic dimensions 
(content, form, and stance) will be used below 
to examine the characteristics of a hoax and 
how it becomes a piece of media.
Understanding the concept of a meme 
brings a very different meaning of the idea of 
“hoaxes” compared to other forms of online 
viral content (viral video, viral ad, viral photo). 
Shifman (2014, p. 56) suggests that meme is 
a collection of texts in the way it is a serial 
reproduction from an original item. Shifman 
emphasizes the practice of imitating an existing 
content into a set of derivatives. However, 
this research argues that meme is a collection 
of texts as a result of how users disassemble 
an original item, overwrite it with new text, 
and alter it into a new form of artefact with a 
new message. It then would not make sense to 
identify text in a meme without referring it to 
other texts, i.e., the original ones. Therefore, 
in understanding hoaxes as memetic practice, 
author argue that it is the transformation of 
meaning resulted from users’ treatment of the 
original item that is important, particularly 
with regards to political information strategies. 
Methods
This paper analyzes hoax content spread 
in the network during Jakarta’s electoral period 
from January to March 2017. This period 
was chosen because it covered the electoral 
campaign week before the first round of 
the election (February 2017) until a month 
before the second round (April 2017). This 
period is important to observe as the political 
temperature was heated up and the supporters 
of each candidate were actively sharing content 
or expressions of support on social media.
A database of hoaxes was obtained from 
TurnBackHoax (https://www.turnbackhoax.id), 
a site managed by MAFINDO, the Indonesian 
anti-hoax community that was established on 
November 2016. The page was chosen because 
it is one of the leading fact-checking sites and 
the archives were derived from discussions on 
a hoax-debunking group on Facebook named 
Forum Anti-Fitnah, Hasut dan Hoax (FAFHH). 
Members of this forum uploaded alleged hoax 
content that they found on social media, then 
the administrators or other members of the 
group would together find valid information 
to clarify whether the content was categorized 
as a hoax or not. 
This research utilized the purposive 
sampling technique. Samples that have been 
analyzed were the ones that were: i) targeted 
the election candidates (Ahok and Anies); ii) 
confirmed as a hoax by the turnbackhoax.
id administrator, iii) circulated on social 
media platform (mostly Facebook, based on 
turnbackhoax.id administrator’s findings). 
At the time the samples were chosen, during 
January to March 2017 there were 15 eligible 
hoax content to be analyzed. Among those 15 
hoax contents, 14 targeted Ahok in the narration 
and only 1 used Anies as the hoax target. 
To analyze hoax content that was spread 
around the electoral campaign week, this 
research employed a qualitative content 
analysis. Utilizing Shifman’s memetic content, 
form, and stance to analyze the content (2014, 
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pp. 39-40), this paper attempts to examine 
the characteristics of hoaxes that emerged 
in Indonesia during the 2017 election. The 
dimension of content is a specific text that 
refers to ideas or ideologies delivered in a 
memetic hoax. This research analyzes what 
messages were conveyed in hoaxes’ text 
through the caption in the image or personal 
comments added by social media user who 
uploaded the image to their account. The 
second dimension related to form of physical 
expressions or appearance of the message. In 
reading this dimension, the study analyzes 
“both visual/audible dimensions specific to 
certain texts and the more complex genre-
related patterns organizing them (such as lip 
sync or animation)’ (Shifman, 2014, p. 40). 
The third dimension, the stance, relates to the 
information that memetic message conveys 
about their own communication. Based on the 
reading of content and form, the research then 
analyzes the dimension of stance by studying 
who is entitled to participate in the message 
as well as the tone and style of communication 
(p. 41). 
These three dimensions will assist 
in identifying ideas, textual practices or 
constructions, and communicative strategies 
in a hoax. Therefore, they can help in not only 
understanding the characteristics of the hoaxes 
being spread during the 2017 Jakarta election, 
but also identifying the role of users in the 
circulation of hoaxes on social media.
Result and Discussion
In the discussion about memetic content, 
it is essential to highlight the users’ treatments 
of the original items spread online in the 
network. The hoax content being analyzed 
in this paper were derivative versions of an 
original item as a result of the user’s treatment 
on it. Most of the treatments involve the 
activities of image editing, caption adding, 
and subsequent sharing to the network. These 
processes are engendering the alteration of 
meaning as users are reframing the original 
information. 
During the Jakarta electoral campaign 
week (January to March 2017), this research 
found 15 hoaxes that correspond to the 
sampling category. The details of the 15 hoaxes 
obtained can be seen in Table 1.
Table 2 below shows the memetic 
dimensions in 7 examples out of all 15 hoaxes 
that this research has analyzed. 
The content  analysis  of  memetic 
dimensions demonstrates that a hoax is 
a complex arrangement of ideas, textual 
practices, and communicative strategies. 
They are intertwined and feed off each other 
in forming a new meaning to deliver to the 
public through sharing activities. Based on 
the analysis of content in the table, hoaxes 
that circulate during the 2017 Jakarta election 
contain information discrediting the election 
candidates. The slandering information 
can be allegations that the candidate has 
engaged in fraudulent activity in order to 
win the election, that the candidate has died, 
is involved in legal cases or has previous 
policies that were harmful to public. The idea 
being presented is that the candidate is not 
worth a vote.
In terms of form, hoax content circulating 
on social media before the 2017 Jakarta election 
demonstrated a specific pattern of how users 
deliver hoax information. When spreading 
hoax content, users tend to:
1. Post an edited image with personal comment 
(Example 1 and 5).
2. Share a link to a blog (fake news) with 
personal comment (Example 2).
3. Post a deceptive statement and an unrelated 
or misinterpreted photo (Example 3 and 4).
4. Post a defaming narrative with claims by a 
perceivably influential figure supported by 
an edited image (Example 6).
5. Post a deceptive statement with support of 
screen captures of chats or Facebook status 
about similar claim (Example 7).
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Table 1.
Hoax samples during January-March 2017 from www.turnbackhoax.id
No Upload Date Title
1 January 3, 2017 Ahok ziarah ke makam ibu angkatnya memakai sepatu (Ahok visited his Mother’s gravesite 
wearing shoes)
2 January 8, 2017 Ahok kabur untuk menghindari amukan warga (Ahok fleed to avoid the people’s fury)
3 January 17, 2017 “Teman Ahok”: Kami semua siap bunuh diri jika Pak Ahok kalah dalam Pilkada 2017 (Friend 
of Ahok: We swear we would commit suicide if Ahok was lost in the 2017 Jakarta election”)
4 January 25, 2017 Kalijodo dimiliki oleh Sinarmas Land (Kalijodo area is owned by Sinarmas Land)
5 January 26, 2017 Temuan money politic dari PASLON No. 2 (Money politic evidence from candidate no. 2)
6 January 26, 2017 Ahok & Djarot Terlibat Perselisihan (Ahok & Djarot involved in disputes)
7 February 6, 2017 Tangkapan Layar dari Video Metro TV Yang Berjudul ‘300 Juta Orang Hadiri Kampanye 
Ahok-Djarot Di Gue 2, Dimeriahkan Band Slank & Iwan Fals’ (Screenshot of Metro TV Video 
Entitled ‘300 Million People Attends My Ahok-Djarot Campaign 2, Performance by Slank 
& Iwan Fals Band’)
8 February 18, 2017 Mujahid Cyber Membela KPU Dari Serangan Hacker Ahok (Mujahid Cyber Defends Com-
mittee of Election from the Attack of Ahok’s Hackers) 
9 February 18, 2017 Istri Ahok: Pribumi Indonesia Jadi Rakyat Aja Ngerepotin, Apalagi Jadi Pemimpin! (Ahok’s 
Wife: Indonesian natives are burdensome, let alone when they become leaders!)
10 February 19, 2017 Ahokers Organization Cyber Team/AOCT meretas dan mengganti data KPUD Pilkada 
2017 (AOCT hacked and modified the results of Ahok’s votes in the 2017 Jakarta election)
11 February 19, 2017 Uang Bayaran dari Tim Basuki-Djarot (Bribe money from Basuki-Djarot Team)
12 March 6, 2017 Prof. Taruna Ikrar: “Ahok dan Pendukungnya Alami Masalah di Otak” (Prof. Taruna Ikrar: 
“AHOK and its supporters have brain problem”)
13 March 6, 2017 KPK jemput paksa Anies Baswedan di rumahnya, karena tersandung korupsi dana Frankfurt 
Book (Commision of Corruption Eradication fetched Anies Baswedan from his house due 
to the Frankfurt Book corruption case)
14 March 6, 2017 Ahok Resmi Dihukum Pancung (Ahok is Officially Beheaded)
15 March 15, 2017 Pendukung Ahok Tidak Paham Sholat Jenazah Tidak Pakai Ruku’ (Supporters of Ahok did 
not know how to practice mortuary prayer)
Source: Data collected by the author
From this finding of textual construction, 
it is visible that this memetic form implies 
hoaxes are circulated with an intention to 
make the misinformation look legitimate. For 
instance, photos that were taken from other 
sources that have no relation to the topic—or 
are related but misleadingly interpreted—are 
used to support false information and create a 
narrative as if the statement is true. Other forms 
of hoaxes are a screen capture of television 
news program with edited headline (Example 1 
and 5). Sometimes it also includes a seemingly 
official source to build the impression that the 
information is legitimate (Example 4). The 
creator or disseminator of the hoax may not 
always intend to make people believe that the 
hoax information is a fact; however, they had 
constructed the text in the hoax content so that 
their memetic idea of “the candidate is not 
worth a vote” appears valid.
In terms of stance, Table 2 illustrates 
that in conveying ideas, the hoax creator or 
disseminator staked the opposite position from 
the candidate discussed in the hoax content. 
The messages generally use persuasive and 
provocative tones to convince the reader or 
receiver of the messages that the information 
is legitimate and at the same time fueling 
people’s existing beliefs or sentiments towards 
the political candidates.
The pattern illustrates the role of hoaxes 
during the Jakarta election in 2017. Repackaged 
images, comments, or links to a post containing 
hoax content are supporting each other in 
expressing the idea/ideology being conveyed 
in the post. The pattern also contributes to 
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Table 2. 
The Memetic Dimensions of Hoaxes during the 2017 Jakarta Election
No. Sample Description Memetic dimensions
1. A user posted an image (a screen 
capture from a news program) and 
a comment to Facebook. 
The headline in the screen 
capture was: “AHOK RESMI 
DIHUKUM PANCUNG [AHOK IS 
OFFICIALLY BEHEADED]” and 
the user’s comment was: “Don’t 
forget to throw his body to the 
sea.”
The image was taken from a 
TV news program in 2014. The 
headline of the news program 
was edited. The original headline 
was: “JELANG PUTUSAN MK 
[LEADING UP TO JUDICIAL 
VERDICT].” 
Content - Ahok has been 
beheaded.
Form - Edited and 
manipulated 
image. 





Stance - The edited 




2. A user posted a link to an article 
on a blog. The article headline 
was: “BREAKING NEWS...!!! 
COMMISION OF CORRUPTION 
ERADICATION FETCHED 
ANIES BASWEDAN AT 8.30 
FROM HIS HOUSE DUE TO 
THE FRANKFURT BOOK 
CORRUPTION CASE….” The user’s 
comment was: “What car should we 
use to pick him up?”
The picture in the article was 
actually from a news report on a 
verified news outlet about factual 
corruption case, but not involving 
Anies Baswedan.
The original photo was used to 
support a non-factual article.
Content - Anies Baswedan 
has been 
implicated in a 
corruption case.
Form - Attached a link 





Stance - The edited image 
suggests hate 
against Anies.






3. A Facebook user shares a photo 
of Kalijodo Green Open Space 
landmark sign with a comment 
claiming that the space has been 
bought by Sinarmas Land, a major 
property developer company in 
Jakarta. 
The user connected the image 
with forced evictions during Ahok 
administration in the beginning of 
Kalijodo green space construction in 
early 2016. The comment indicated 
that Ahok was evicting people from 
Kalijodo so he could sell the land to 
the conglomerates.
The picture was genuine; however, 
Sinarmas Land was the developer 
who built the green open space but 
did not buy it.




Form - Deceptive 
statement.
- Factual and 
original photo—
but has been 
misused.




continued to page 93
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4. A Facebook user posted a picture 
and insert a comment:
“Found money politic evidence 
from candidate No. 2 [Ahok-
Djarot] … in West Jakarta … 
ranging from Rp500,000 to 
Rp1,000,000 … Take the money, 
but don’t vote for them
#caught in the act with evidence.”
The photo was abused. It was 
originally from an article on a 
trusted news site antaranews.com, 
dated August 13, 2013, covering an 
issue that has no correlations with 
2017 Jakarta Election.
Content Ahok had paid/
bribed the citizens 




Captured images of 
Facebook posts with 
similar claims.




5. A user posted an image (a screen 
capture from a news program) and a 
comment to Facebook. 
The headline in the screen capture 
was: FRIEND OF AHOK: WE 
SWEAR WE WOULD COMMIT 
SUICIDE IF AHOK WAS LOST IN 
THE 2017 ELECTION,” and the 
user’s comment was:
“WATCH TV NOW
I hope they kill themselves for 
whatever reason. See, I’ve told you 
Team Ahok (Ahokers) are out of 
their mind… let’s get this viral!”
The original image was taken 
from a screen capture from a 
TV news program on December 
4, 2016. The headline of the 
news program was edited. The 
original headline was: “PARADE 
BUDAYA KITA INDONESIA [‘WE 
ARE INDONESIA’ CULTURAL 
FESTIVAL].” 
Content - Friend of Ahok 
(Ahok’s supporter 
community) 
made a vow to 
commit suicide if 
Ahok did not win 
the election




Stance - User’s comment 
suggest hatred 
against Ahok.
6. A Facebook user posted a narrative 
about Ahok and his supporters 
having a “brain/mental problem.” 
The post included a picture 
of a scientist with a headline: 
“AHOK and his supporters 
have brain problem....” The 
narrative stated that Dr. Taruna 
Ikrar, an Indonesian professor 
from University of California 
Neurobiology, United States 
has claimed that Ahok had a 
personality disorder and needed to 
get his brain examined.
Dr. Taruna Ikrar via his Twitter 
account clarified that the narrative 
is not true as he has never made 
such claim.




signaling that he 
was not qualified 
to lead Jakarta
Form - Defaming 
narrative.








continued to page 94
connection from page 92
94
Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, Volume 22, Issue 2, November 2018
7. A post from a Facebook account 
claimed that Mujahid Cyber 
Muslim were trying to defend the 
Election Commission’s site from 
hacker attacks. It claimed that the 
hackers were from Ahok’s team 
who wanted to change Jakarta 
election data. It also claimed 
that the site was down for a few 
moments. When it was working 
again, all the data has changed.
The user captured chats and other 
posts showing similar claims.
Turnbackhoax.id clarified that 
the data on the site has changed 
as the result of vote updates not 
because of the hackers. The site 
itself was not a legitimate vote 
counting device. Any changes that 
happened on the site would not 
have affected the election result.
Content - Ahok’s IT team 
was trying to 







Form - Deceptive 
statement.
- Captured images 
of Facebook posts 
with similar 
claims.




Source: Data collected by the author
connection from page 93
assessing how a hoax is used as a tool for 
staking a position in the election. Hoax content 
was mainly circulated with the addition of the 
user’s comments. The comments embedded 
with the hoax content that was shared indicates 
one’s interpretation of the text and political 
position. For example, edited images with a 
deceitful statement reflect resentment against 
a candidate. It does not always indicate which 
candidate they support, but it is clear that they 
are using the hoax to attack people they are 
opposing.
In exploring hoax as a meme, all the 
hoax examples in this paper act like memes in 
how they dismantle “existing source material 
everyone knows to tap into ideas or sentiments 
people connect with” (Mallonee, 2017, para. 
4). Someone takes a photo, a GIF or a drawing 
and alters it with words, Photoshop, or other 
images to send a message. That message 
resonates with other people, who spread 
it around and adapt it. The majority of the 
hoaxes identified were built like memes. In 
Example 1 and 5, for instance, the creator 
appropriated screen capture from a television 
news program and altered it by editing the 
headline. They are similar to Example 7. The 
creator made a defaming narrative with claims 
by a perceivably  influential figure supported 
by an edited image. The manipulation did not 
repeat a meaning that was already there; it 
created it. In Example 7, Ahok was said to be 
having a mental/brain problem that resulted 
in his harsh behaviour. According to the 
narrative, the claim was stated by a perceivably 
influential figure (a professor) supported by the 
image of the figure and caption written over 
it. The site www.turnbackhoax.id debunked 
it confirming that it was not true. However, 
Ahok’s controversial attitude confirmed the 
issue being raised in the hoax content. Ahok 
did not have mental or brain illness, but that 
does not matter. The implication is still read 
as fact. So regardless of the accuracy, people 
still shared it because it was a representation 
of what they thought about Ahok. 
Dovetailing with that notion, hoaxes 
as memes are not just a series of copied and 
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imitated items, but they also contain the creator’s 
or distributor’s ideology and interpretation 
regarding issues raised in the society. It is visible 
in the contexts of local electoral politics discussed 
in this paper. Users had taken a product that 
was originally designed for different objectives, 
reproduced texts in the form of false information, 
and linked it with political candidates. They 
repurposed the texts for a vehicle to transmit 
the misinformation they created about the 
candidates. The intervention by users turns a 
text into something else, although the original 
information is accurate. It can be problematic 
in political context because people may see 
the new item of information as verified and 
legitimate, where in fact it is a product of a users’ 
intervention. 
In politics, hoax as memetic practice has 
the potential to form a community of shared 
beliefs and ideology. If memes are used to 
participate in a normative debate about how 
the world should look and the best way to 
achieve it (Shifman, 2014, p. 119), then hoaxes 
are both the vehicles for this promotion and 
the subversion of normative debate. In an ever-
connected world where speed takes precedence 
over truth, the issue in a hoax can quickly 
become a talking point for the members of the 
community—even if it has been proved as false. 
The general spread of political hoaxes 
in Indonesia leads to the emergence of fact-
checking websites such as Turnbackhoax.id, the 
database source for this study. Turnbackhoax.
id is an acclaimed non-partisan fact-checking 
site run by a team of volunteers and receives 
the help of Facebook pages Forum Anti Fitnah, 
Hasut and Hoax (FAFHH) mentioned earlier 
in this paper. Volunteers of this site always 
monitor their social media feeds and check 
with credible sources when they find any 
indications of a hoax (Renaldi, 2017, para. 
13). The administrators mainly use online 
search engines to find valid information to 
clarify issues raised in hoax content. If it is a 
legitimate hoax, the volunteers post it on the 
website. The objective of this site is to build 
an accessible database for the public, and it 
indeed has grown into “an important resource 
for Indonesians to check the veracity of memes 
and fake stories” (Renaldi, 2017, para. 12). It 
also illustrates that such fact-checking activities 
are now increasingly significant, especially 
when the political temperature was rising in 
the lead up to an election. The FAFHH group 
even engendered new forms of participation 
and user engagement with social media by 
allowing the members of the group to ask and 
clarify hoax contents. 
Conclusion
The study in this paper analyzes 15 hoax 
samples found through the www.turnbackhoax.
id website during January-March 2017. Of the 
15 hoaxes analyzed, 14 of them attacked the 
incumbent candidate, Basuki Tjahja Purnama 
(Ahok), and only 1 was addressed to rival 
candidate, Anies Baswedan (Anies). There 
was a significant gap in the statistics of the 
hoax samples addressing the two candidates; 
however, this research was not intended to 
compare them. It instead aims to investigate the 
characteristics of a hoax circulated during the 
Jakarta electoral period in early 2017. Based on 
the analysis of the dimensions of content, form, 
and stance of all hoax examples, it is visible that 
hoax content spread in Indonesia during the 
electoral period carried out the idea to attack a 
candidate. The idea of political hoaxes during 
the 2017 Jakarta election is that the candidates 
is fraudulent or not qualified to be a leader. 
In terms of form, the hoaxes propagated 
in Indonesia during the 2017 Jakarta election 
were in the form of edited images with a 
personal comment, a deceptive statement with 
an unknown or unrelated picture to support 
false information, a post containing a link to a 
fake news blog and own commentary, as well as 
a false narrative with professional or scientific 
claim from influential figures. Meanwhile, the 
dimension of stance was depicted in the way 
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that the hoax creator or disseminators position 
themselves against the political candidates. It 
is visible that the imitation and propagation 
of edited images with a deceitful statement 
reflect the role of hoaxes as a means to stake a 
political position. When sharing a hoax content 
together with a resentful personal comment, 
it is clear that a user utilizes hoax as a tool to 
attack people they are opposing, although it is 
not conclusive whether it means they support 
the other candidates.
As a memetic practice, hoaxes spread 
in Indonesia during the 2017 Jakarta election 
cannibalize an original item and alter it into a 
new form of artefact with a new message. The 
new form and message resonate with existing 
beliefs in society. As a consequence, a hoax can 
create a culture that is based on a shared belief 
among the community. Therefore, hoax has 
the potential to be used as tool of partisanship. 
However, in turn, the use of hoax as a means of 
political partisanship can be dangerous as it can 
overpower the truth and lead people to avoid 
believing facts. Further work is needed to assess 
the strategies to counter the negative effects of 
hoaxes particularly in Indonesian politics.
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